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ABSTRACT. Burundi recently introduced two fundamental reforms to its health system: a district health 
system (DHS) and performance-based inancing (PBF) of the healthcare facilities.
The authors of this article set out to conduct a simultaneous trial on implementation of DHS and PBF.
The assessment refers to the six building blocks of health systems proposed by the WHO, and demonstrates 
that PBF can either have a leverage effect or hinder the following functional elements of the DHS: the group 
dynamics of the District Health Management Team (DHMT), the way the district hospital functions in rela-
tion to the primary health care level, the curative and preventive health services provided by health centers to 
provide health cover for a target population, the provision of essential medication by a fully-functional dis-
trict pharmacy, the action-focused on the health management information system (HMIS) and funding that 
ensures fair provision and guaranteed resupply, supported by a transparent organization.
The authors recommend that these aspects receive the attention they deserve as part of initiatives that com-
bine both reforms, especially in the start-up stage. The health system regulator – the Ministry of Health – must 
remain vigilant to make any necessary adjustments and to avoid negative consequences.
Keywords. Performance-based inancing, Health system, Health district, Functionality.
1. Introduction
The purpose of the district health system (DHS) is to imple-
ment primary health care, a strategy deined by the 1978 
Alma Ata International Conference (WHO/UNICEF, 1978), 
whose relevance was recently reafirmed in a world health 
report on Primary Health Care (WHO, 2008). In the case of 
Africa, the policy to reintroduce the primary health care strat-
egy was redeined at the Harare Conference in 1987 by set-
ting out the DHS guidelines and was reafirmed in April 2008 
by the Ouagadougou Declaration (WHO, 2008). As a result, 
the health district appears to be the cornerstone of health sys-
tems based on primary health care (Monekosso, 1991; 
Duponchel, 2004; Grodos, 2004; Gruénais, 2010; Gauvrit 
and Okalla, 2010). This element is more or less autonomous-
ly separate from the national health system, and is 
suficiently big to enable concentration of human, technical 
and inancial resources, but at the same time, it is small 
enough to be able to hold out the possibility of communica-
tion with local populations and community involvement. The 
health district remains by far the most appropriate operational 
level for implementation of the National Health Policy 
(NHP).
In recent years, a number of countries in Asia and Africa 
have introduced performance-based inancing into their 
health systems as a strategy for improving performance 
(Perrot et al, 2010). The contribution made by PBF to im-
prove the production and quality of health services by boost-
ing staff motivation is beginning to be documented (Soeters 
and Grifiths, 2003; Soeters et al, 2006; Rusa et al, 2006; 
Toonen et al, 2009; Morgan, 2010).
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PBF is sometimes presented as an alternative to the failing 
institutional arrangements currently in place (Meessen and 
Van Damme, 2005). However, despite more critical literature 
on PBF (Oxman & Fretheim, 2008; Eldridge and Palmer, 
2009, Kalk et al, 2010; Morgan, 2010), to the best of our 
knowledge, only one author has been interested in the impact 
of PBF on health district operation (Meessen, 2009).
In Burundi, DHS and PBF were introduced almost simulta-
neous. The PBF arrangements apply to healthcare delivery 
facilities (health centers and hospitals) and the administrative 
bodies (health provinces and district healthcare).
Wishing to avoid, at this early stage, to appraise a reform 
which is only just beginning, the purpose of this article is to 
highlight the possible synergies between the DHS approach 
and the PBF approach in a given context. The article also ana-
lyzes the risks of negative effects on the DHS if PBF is not 
used advisedly. We begin with a brief introduction, and then 
move on to describe the background and the methodological 
approach, followed by a description of the facts based on the 
diagram of the six building blocks of the health system, and 
we conclude with a summary of the key messages 
presented.
2. Background
In Burundi, the process of structuring the country into health 
districts began in 2007 following a long sociopolitical crisis 
(1993-2005). The PBF experiment (also known as “contrac-
tual approach”) began in 2006 and was extended to several of 
the country’s provinces in the years that followed, with the 
support of a number of technical and inancial partners. This 
contractualization was based on a contract between a third-
party agency independent of service providers, such as the 
Ministry for Public Health (MPH), and the service providers 
(health care delivery points). It was this third-party agency 
that was responsible for evaluating performance and subsi-
dies, as well as acting as purchsaser and inspector. The prin-
cipal contributor was the NGO Cordaid, which replicated its 
Rwanda experiment in Burundi (Soeters et al, 2006). In April 
2010, with funding from the World Bank, the government 
and other inancial partners, the Ministry for Public Health 
set up a PBF system, which was managed internally within 
the Ministry, involving no independent purchasing agency. 
However, the veriication and validation of performance on 
which payment by the Finance Ministry is based are the re-
sponsibility of provincial veriication and validation commit-
tees (PVVCs), which are mixed structures made up of gov-
ernment representatives (civil servants and contract staff) on 
the one hand, and representatives of ‘civil society’ on the 
other. The PVVC secretariat’s responsibilities were taken 
care of by provincial medical directors of health. The institu-
tional funding package for PBF and those involved in it have 
been discussed by other authors (Basenya et al, 2011).
The PBF funding of health delivery points (health centers 
and hospitals) is based on two types of criteria:
• quantitative (care production), evaluated monthly by 
PVVCs on the basis on 24 indicators
• qualitative (various aspects of quality service), evalu-
ated quarterly by the MPH bodies on the basis of a 
matrix containing a very large number of different 
indicators
The goal of care production funding is not only to reward 
the performance of the healthcare delivery points (HDP), but 
also to remove user fees in the health sector to children under 
ive and pregnant women. Until April 2010, this measure to 
provide “abolition of user fees”, introduced by the Head of 
State in May 2006, was funded from the debt relief fund as 
part of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative. 
This mechanism enabled service providers to be reimbursed 
for the cost of free treatment for those eligible (children and 
women). The option to fund the free treatment package 
through the performance-based inancing strategy was 
thought to be preferable to the old reimbursement system 
which was felt to be inadequate. The service provider incen-
tive system, the procedures used to authenticate the provision 
of free services and the release of funds by the Ministry of 
Finance all left a lot to be desired in terms of management. So 
since April 2009, performance-based inancing has been in-
troduced for the “minimum package of activities” (MPA for 
health centers) and for the “complementary package of ac-
tivities” (CPA for hospitals). This funding includes “abolition 
of user fees” based on lat-rate pricing.
3. Methodology
The analysis described in this article is based on the imple-
mentation of the DHS and PBF experience as part of the 
“Santé Plus” 1 (Health Plus) project and on joint evaluation 
results of the PBF project. As part of his job, one of the au-
thors of this article (GN) has irst-hand grassroots experience 
of the various stages of DHS and PBF implementation. The 
second author coordinated the mid-point evaluation of the 
PBF project conducted by the WHO, the World Bank (WB) 
and the European Union (EU).
In presenting the results, we have adopted a framework of 
analysis based on the functional structure of the health dis-
trict which also addresses the six health system building 
blocks recommended by the WHO (WHO, 2008). The fol-
lowing table sets out the key elements of the six building 
blocks and the corresponding topics analyzed by ourselves.
The salient points raised concerning this experience in 
DHS and FPB synergy are inferred with reference to certain 
counterproductive effects that can result from the effect of 
PBF on the process of DHS introduction. To avoid these 
1  The “Santé Plus” project is a link project between aid relief, rehabilitation and development of the 9th FED, which began in April 2008 in four 
provinces, and extended in February 2010 to six provinces, representing 30% of the country’s population, 14 health districts, 15 hospitals and more 
than 200 health centers. The project ended in June 2011. Its two major strands are the implementation of the DHS and PBF. Between January 2009 
and March 2010, the “Santé Plus” project subcontracted the implementation of PBF to the NGO Cordaid, an independent third-party agency. The 
zone covered by the project applied the national PBF policy with effect from April 2010 (with the exception of a few provisional secondary points). 
The experiment conducted in this zone forms the basis of our analysis of the interactions between DHS and PBF.
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adverse effects, we suggest a number of corrective measures 
which we hope will attract the attention of those initiating 
these reforms.
This article does not deal specii cally with the issues of 
leadership and governance. However, some issues relating to 
this point are included in our remarks regarding the manage-
ment and coordination of districts by the district management 
team (DMT).
3.1 Results / Description of facts
The reform of the health system into health districts in 
Burundi was launched by the government in 2007, although 
technically-speaking, none of these districts were really func-
tional as such. The “Santé Plus” project began work in the 
i eld during the second half of 2008: one of its missions was 
to support the government in the introduction of the DHS and 
PBF. Below, we present the results obtained in accordance 
with the plan described in the methodology.
3.1.1 A district management team to assume 
responsibility for the coordination and smooth-
running of the district ofi ce as an integrated 
department
The district management teams were introduced throughout 
the country in September 2008. The priority of the “Santé 
Plus” project, which covers 9 districts in its area of opera-
tions, was to make these districts technically competent and 
psychologically open to the relationship aspects of district 
health system management by the end of 2009. The aim was 
to ensure that DMTs would be made up of people with the 
same level of responsibility to manage the district, 
on the basis of sharing technical responsibilities based not on 
individual specialties, but on the wider multi-skilled 
versatility of the team as a unit, and with the ability to self 
evaluate and correct decisions. PBF was introduced in 
January 2009. In terms of positive effect, the PBF gave dis-
trict ofi ces the opportunity to access budget planning, al-
though this was late in coming and was granted in small 
tranches, and remained largely insufi cient (Basenya et al, 
2011). Furthermore, as can be seen in Figures 1 & 2, the use 
of services improved appreciably, although it is impossible to 
Table 1. The six building blocks of the health system and factors analyzed.
The six building blocks 
of the health system
Topics addressed by building block impacted by the concomitant implementation of the DHS 
and PBF system 
Health workforce A district management team (DMT) responsible for the coordination and smooth-running of the 
district ofi ce as an integrated department
Health service delivery A district hospital delivering the “complementary package of activities” with a referral and 
counter-referral system
The inclusion of curative and preventive treatments delivered by a multi-skilled team in health 
centers on the basis of a “minimum package of activities” aimed at an identii ed target 
population
Health technologies and products Provision of essential medication based on a district pharmacy
Health information systems An action-focused health information system
Health i nancing systems Funding that ensures fair provision and guaranteed resupply, supported by a transparent 
organization
Leadership and governance
Figure 2. Trend in hospital admissions 2005/2009 Gihoi  HD
Figure 1. Monthly trend of caesarian sections 2005/2009 Bururi HD

















G.Nsengiyumva et al: The simultaneous introduction of the district health system and performance-based funding: the Burundi experiment
4 Field Actions Science Reports
say whether this is due to PBF, because there were other fac-
tors involved, such as the introduction of free treatment for 
children under 5 and pregnant women. The availability of 
doctors also improved.
By the end of 2009, the DMTs in the project area were 
more or less functional, and were much more eficient than 
in those districts of the country that had not beneited from 
project technical support or PBF. It is however impossible to 
differentiate between the contributions made by the project 
and the effect speciic to PBF. It would be reasonable to be-
lieve that PBF has potentialized the training and leadership 
offered to DMTs by the project insofar as management and 
organizational indicators were contracted, including regular 
meetings and the subsequent implementation of meeting rec-
ommendations, monthly action plans monitored by DMTs 
and the supportive supervision based on the quality of care. 
However, on the negative side, the inclusion of the district 
medical oficer on the provincial veriication and validation 
committee (PVVC) breaks with the dynamic of an integrated 
team by removing the district head who is the leader of his 
team and by making him part of another team with other 
functions. The inclusion of the district head on the PVVC 
gives him a more administrative overview of the health sys-
tem, but with no innovative involvement in the management 
of his own district, despite the fact that it is a key level in a 
vision of decentralization, as was demonstrated by the joint 
PBF evaluation mission conducted in Burundi in October 
2010 (Musango et al. 2010).
The inclusion of the district medical oficer on the PVVC 
contradicts the principle of separation of job function. He is 
simultaneously required to be both a service provider be-
cause he has ultimate responsibility for the performance of 
his district (not only his district ofice), and a regulator, since 
it is his responsibility to validate the veriication process.
Furthermore, since a district medical oficer is often also a 
hospital manager, he receives a number of different pay-
ments and allowances, such as a performance-related pay-
ment from the hospital, a performance-related payment as a 
district medical oficer, an allowance as a member of the 
PVVC and payment in respect of the technical supervision 
exercised when conducting peer reviews of hospitals outside 
his own district. This puts great strain on the team spirit of 
the DMT, because the other members then have the impres-
sion that the district head is ‘overpaid’, whereas the results 
are actually achieved by the team as a whole. This therefore 
has a negative impact on the eficiency and performance of 
the DMT.
Nevertheless, it is not impossible to integrate both func-
tions: the district medical oficer is perfectly capable of as-
suming the remits of the DMT and incorporating into those 
the PBF supervisory responsibilities he or she has as a func-
tion of his main role which is to guarantee  quality of care. 
However, if in his day-to-day activities, he chooses the op-
tion of considering the two reforms as being different, he is 
more likely to focus on the option which pays more. Since, 
in Burundi, the PBF project is more inancially motivating 
than the DHS project, it has encouraged service providers to 
focus more on PBF activities, to the detriment of DHS ac-
tivities, and this comes through in all the evaluation reports.
Our proposal is that the two reforms should be conducted 
in synergy. For example, the PBF quality evaluations and the 
DHS technical supervisory responsibilities should both have 
the same goals and the same purpose.
3.1.2 A district hospital offering the “complementary 
package of activities” with a referral and 
counter-referral system
All (but one) of the districts in the zone covered by the 
“Santé Plus” project had a district hospital, but these func-
tioned to varying degrees. However, none functioned as a 
district hospital, i.e. as part of a structured network of rela-
tionships with the health centers. The appointment of DMTs 
in 2008 was intended to improve this situation. The DMT 
has become the senior coordinating body for the hospital and 
health centers. Within the DHS structure, the hospital deliv-
ers its CPA without overlapping the MPA delivered by health 
centers. This situation has led to the hospital carrying out 
tasks devolved to the health center, thereby undermining the 
credibility of health centers, overloading the hospital unnec-
essarily, and negates the principle of referral and counter-
referral and the gradation of care levels (Van Lerberghe & 
Lafort, 1990). If it is to strengthen the DHS, PBF must there-
fore remain consistent with the role of the district hospital. 
So, when PBF was irst implemented in the project zone, the 
system put in place did not fund the activities of the primary 
(health center) level of care where this was provided by the 
hospital. But the PBF system operating at national level 
since April 2010, prior to the revision of the Procedures 
Manual2 in September 2011, did not adopt this principle, 
which resulted in undesirable competition between health 
centers and hospitals. Because doctors’ consultations are 
highly paid, the tendency was to increase medical consulta-
tions at the hospital to maximize hospital funding. No dis-
tinction was made between a referred patient and a patient 
seeking direct consultation from a doctor for a commonplace 
condition that could have been treated in a health center. 
This trend was further strengthened with the principle of ab-
solute free choice on the part of the patient (i.e. no extra 
charge payable by the patient to see a doctor directly). This 
state of affairs does not encourage the grading of treatment 
delivery (the non-overlapping complementarity of the DHS 
primary and secondary levels), it undermines the credibility 
of nurse consultations in the eyes of the population and it 
tends to overburden the hospital medical consultation 
process.
Our proposal aligns with that of the joint PBF evaluation 
mission to Burundi in October 2010 (Musango et al. 2010). 
The subsidizing of services must respect the referral and 
counter-referral system, and be applied only to those servic-
es provided to patients referred to the hospital on the basis of 
this principle.
2  Ministry of Public Health and the ight against AIDS, Manual of procedures to implement performance-based funding in Burundi, revised version, 
September 2011.
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3.1.3 The inclusion of curative and preventive treat-
ments delivered by a multi-skilled team in health 
centers on the basis of a “minimum package of 
activities” aimed at an identiied target population
Within the DHS, the health center is the primary level of care, 
and as such constitutes the basic operational level (WHO, 
2008). PBF is a method of providing direct funding for this 
primary level of care based on its production.
One of the criteria governing health center location is nor-
mally population to be covered by the health center. The 
health center is responsible for an identiied target popula-
tion, so the actual performance of the health center concerned 
is measured in terms of public health, and not simply in terms 
of the number of consultations and/or treatments. Within the 
PBF system, all the MPA indicators used are quantity indica-
tors (MPH, 2010). Regardless of the indicator (prenatal con-
sultations, deliveries, curative consultations, etc.), it is the 
number of consultations that is taken into account, quite inde-
pendently of patient origin. As Meessen et al. (2006) ex-
plains, there is no doubt that this option favors the funding of 
services on the basis of use, and allows HDPs to be remuner-
ated in direct proportion to their workload. But if the evalua-
tion of performance indicators does not take account of the 
population for which the health center is responsible, the in-
formation regarding its performance relative to its health cov-
erage mission is lost. So performance can be evaluated from 
two different angles: irstly, on the basis of the healthcare fa-
cility workload, and secondly, on the basis of the performance 
of the healthcare facility in relation to its area of 
responsibility.
As far as the workload is concerned, there should be incen-
tives for all the activities healthcare facilities are required to 
carry out. Each time a user uses a service, the healthcare fa-
cility should receive payment to relect the service concerned. 
This system has several disadvantages: (i) There is no thresh-
old imposed that obliges the health center to produce x new 
users before its level of remuneration increases to a new lev-
el; (ii) It is the absolute activity itself that is taken into ac-
count when calculating the payment and not the marginal 
improvements in relation to what is currently being produced; 
(iii) This system is an  advantage for health centers responsi-
ble for a large target population (Meessen et al, 2006).
In relation to the population covered: the healthcare facility 
must have an overview of the care needs of the population 
within its area of responsibility, and a mission to provide ef-
fective cover in this area. Working in collaboration with other 
stakeholders, the DMT must be familiar with the problems 
affecting the population for which it is responsible and must 
be accountable for the latter (WHO, 2008).
When evaluating performance, both aspects must be con-
sidered to avoid the effect of concentrating on other popula-
tion groups “outside the region” in order to receive higher 
funding.
It is recommended that: “To draw up a roadmap for health 
which will also provide a clearer deinition of the PBF objec-
tives in terms of health coverage and set out performance-
based remuneration on the basis of good coverage” (Musango 
et al, 2010). The subsidizing of services must respect the re-
ferral and counter-referral system, and be applied only to 
those services provided to patients referred to the hospital on 
the basis of this principle.
3.1.4 Provision of essential medicines  
based on a district pharmacy
Within its six building blocks for health systems, the WHO 
recommends a health system that guarantees fair access to 
essential medicines and medical supplies, as well as vaccines 
and other technologies that are of good quality, present no 
danger and are available at the lowest cost (WHO, 2008).
The essential medicines strategy adopted by the govern-
ment of Burundi aims to promote the rational use of essential 
generic medicines of known provenance, and to discourage 
recourse to a large number of branded – sometimes superlu-
ous - commercial formulations, imported without controls 
and sold at excessive prices. Not only does this reduce costs 
for the health system and patients, but it also avoids patients 
taking large numbers of ineffective medicines, thereby ex-
posing themselves to undesired side effects (GTZ, 2004).
The following table sets out the measures taken to ensure 
the implementation of the sourcing strategy for essential 
medicines in Burundi.
Table 2. Measures adopted for the sourcing strategy for es-
sential medicines.
Organization and administration of the sourcing and distribution 
circuit on the basis on actual requirements, in accordance with 
the population to be treated and the most common illnesses, or 
on the basis of actual consumption recommended by precise pre-
scription instructions
Funding of the management system (for example, the introduc-
tion of working capital)
Management of medication stocks and resupply for the full 
range of health services by reducing the direct and indirect costs 
of transportation and sourcing
Quality control of medication. This policy is generally imple-
mented on-site via the “district pharmacies”
Source: Burundi Ministry of Health.
Such a policy runs contrary to the “free” sourcing of branded 
pharmaceutical products which beneits the pharmaceutics in-
dustry, the wholesalers and private pharmacies, offering no 
guarantee of lowest cost, quality control or transparent transac-
tion management. This is also the reason why the implementa-
tion of a policy favoring essential medicines encounters such 
3  Via circular letter no. 630/1359/2009, the Minister for Public Health gave a permanent instruction on June 17, 2009 setting out the standards, mo-
dalities and rules to be respected concerning the management of the medication system in the health centers, district hospitals and district pharma-
cies. The instruction sets out the rules governing recourse to private wholesalers.
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major resistance (GTZ, 2004). To ensure that these measures 
are implemented in Burundi without any of the drawbacks im-
posed by possible sourcing system failures and to avoid stock-
outs, the Minister for Public Health3, in his role as regulator, 
has set out clear instructions that take account of all eventu-
alities and set out clear rules governing the methods to be 
used by district pharmacies in obtaining stock from approved 
private wholesalers to guarantee quality at a competitive 
price. Health service providers  must not be encouraged to 
source products at will under any pretext of maintaining free 
market principles. This option is certainly not compatible 
with the DHS.
The authors are aware of the limitations of the national pur-
chasing center and the resulting stock-outs that may occur in 
district pharmacies. Circular letter no. 630/1359/2009 of June 
17, 2009 speciies what is to be done in the event of stock-
outs at the Purchasing Center. One possible solution would 
be to strengthen the purchasing center by deining perfor-
mance indicators to be regularly evaluated as part of PBF. 
This would be the responsibility of the Ministry of Health 
which would ensure permanent availability of tracer medica-
tions at purchasing center level.
3.1.5 An action-orientated health management  
information system
An effective health management information system (HMIS) 
guarantees production, analysis, dissemination and use of reli-
able and timely information on health determinants, health sys-
tem performance and population health status (WHO, 2008). 
PBF should capitalize on the existing health management infor-
mation system already in place in Burundi, instead of encourag-
ing the different levels of the health system to implement parallel 
systems for the purpose of gathering data speciic to PBF. This is 
what is happening in Burundi, resulting in healthcare providers 
collecting data on indicators remunerated by PBF, and veriied 
by the PVVCs. However, this veriication does not cover non-
funded performance and does not feed data back to the national 
health management information system. This represents a lost 
opportunity to ensure that PBF contributes to improving the 
MPH health information system. Worse still, there is a risk that 
this could destroy the existing system, without being capable of 











































































Figure 3. Health district ofice revenue prior to PBF – 2009 
and during PBF- 2011, Bujumbura, 2011
The authors are aware of the limitations of the HMIS and the 
quality of data held by this system in Burundi. However, it would 
be preferable to strengthen and structure the existing national 
HMIS rather than to create another system speciic to PBF. Our 
recommendation aligns with that of the joint mission: to reinforce 
the existing health management information system and to en-
sure proper coordination to guarantee the reliability of data gath-
ered and avoid duplication of use (Musango et al, 2010).
3.1.6 Funding that ensures fair provision and  
guaranteed resupply, supported by a  
transparent organization.
It should be noted that the introduction of PBF has contrib-
uted to the inancial viability of health facilities and delivery 
points, although this contribution remains insuficient. Nor 
does it guarantee management transparency in isolation. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the improving trend in revenue (in 
millions of Burundi Francs - BIF) for district health ofices 


















Figure 4. Provincial health ofice revenue prior to PBF- 2009 
and during PBF-2011, Bujumbura, 2011
It has meant that certain HDPs make small investments en-
abling the delivery of the MPA or the improvement of service 
quality in general. HDP patient frequency has also increased. 
But it is impossible to separate the effect of PBF introduction 
(January 2009) from the introduction of abolition of user fees 
for pregnant women and children under ive (May 2006), the 
progressive stabilization of the country (2006-2007) and the 
direct or indirect inluence of the project itself. These factors 
have certainly acted in synergy, and this same synergy has 
also contributed to performance outcomes in general. The 
combining of PBF and abolition of user fees for pregnant 
women and children under 5 has had its inluence on demand. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that an effective funding sys-
tem means that it is possible to secure suficient funds to en-
sure accessibility of the population to treatment and services, 
at the same time as protecting it from catastrophic expendi-
ture in achieving them (WHO, 2008). This route to funding 
demand should be analyzed in order to address other catego-
ries of the population not subsidized by the PBF/abolition of 
user fees combination. These include other forms of payment 
for treatment, such as national health insurance (NHI) and/or 
community based health insurance (CBHI).
4. Conclusion
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This experience in Burundi which combines the introduction 
of DHS and PBF is an original approach. It would be worth-
while to capitalize on the strengths identiied during its im-
plementation and to address its weaknesses.
The experiment offers an opportunity to introduce successful 
reforms that could be further extended. But if we are not careful, 
the functionality of the health district could be threatened at any 
time by some of the performance-based funding methods. In this 
respect, we would highlight the DMT which addresses only PBF 
to the detriment of other activities, PBF-speciic HMIS, the 
health coverage not included under the scheme, the free sourcing 
of pharmaceutical products and the referral and counter-referral 
system that is not covered by PBF.
In the early years of implementing any reform, the health 
system regulator (in this case the Ministry) must remain vigi-
lant, must make any necessary adjustments and avoid any 
slippage, especially where there are multiple stakeholders in-
volved. So early evaluation allows any start-up problems to 
be addressed and corrected.
Those responsible for the implementation of PBF must 
take account the public health issues, because these are an 
important factor in improved health system performance. 
PBF is a reform to be used by the health system, and contrib-
utes signiicantly to implementation of the DHS.
Box 1. Key messages
•  Performance-based inancing is a powerful re-
source for the health system and can reinforce 
the introduction of a district health system 
(DHS) 
•  The introduction of performance-based inanc-
ing (PBF) must take account of the basic prin-
ciples of primary healthcare if it is to avoid im-
posing counterproductive impacts on the 
process of structuring the health system into 
health districts.
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